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Drill Baby Drill? Political and Market Influences on Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing in the Western United States

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  • Karen Maguire

    (Oklahoma State University)

Abstract

This paper examines the influence of the federal political environment on the number of leases that were issued for oil and natural gas development on Bureau of Management (BLM) lands in the western United States between 1983 and 2008. Using a fixed effects model for a 17-state sample of the westernmost states in the contiguous United States, the findings indicate oil and natural gas prices were jointly significant predictors of both non-competitive leasing and overall leasing outcomes, but were not independently statistically significant. In terms of political influence, regulatory shifts played a significant role in determining the type of leasing; competitive versus non-competitive, though ideological influence was not robustly significant. Lastly, there was not consistent variation in political influence between states with substantial BLM lands and those with minimal BLM lands, although there were some disparate effects on non-competitive leasing.

Suggested Citation

  • Karen Maguire, 2013. "Drill Baby Drill? Political and Market Influences on Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing in the Western United States," Economics Working Paper Series 1401, Oklahoma State University, Department of Economics and Legal Studies in Business, revised Apr 2013.
    • Handle: RePEc:okl:wpaper:1401
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    File URL: https://business.okstate.edu/site-files/docs/ecls-working-papers/OKSWP1401.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Maguire, Karen, 2012. "Prices or politics? The influence of markets and political party changes on oil and gas development in the United States," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 2013-2020.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Oil; Natural Gas; Energy Markets; Federal Lands; Politics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices

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