IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/015895.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Política y Reconciliación: Una coyuntura crítica para la construcción de Estado

Author

Listed:
  • Francisco Eslava
  • Leopoldo Fergusson
  • Andrés Moya

Abstract

Describimos algunas características del ambiente político en Colombia, a partir de una base de datos panel única con cerca de 10,000 hogares. Comparando respuestas en 2013 y 2016, documentamos una persistente falta de interés en política y un clientelismo prevaleciente, con vínculos personales dominando a las afinidades partidistas. El involucramiento en la compra clientelista de votos, en cambio, es bastante variable en el tiempo, y los hogares entran y salen de estas relaciones. Contradiciendo las más simples y optimistas teorías de la modernización, no encontramos que incrementos en la riqueza del hogar estén correlacionados con el abandono del clientelismo. En cambio, los cambios en la debilidad del estado (medida con la evasión tributaria) sí se correlacionan fuertemente con cambio en el clientelismo. Fortalecer el estado parece, por lo tanto, una tarea prioritaria. Entendiendo los esfuerzos de construcción de paz como un paso en esta dirección nos conduce a examinar las actitudes hacia el reciente proceso de paz entre el gobierno y las Farc, el grupo guerrillero más grande en Colombia. Con unas preguntas especiales incluidas en el 2016, evaluamos las opiniones de los hogares sobre estos temas. Los datos muestran una curiosa combinación de indiferencia y polarización hacia el proceso de paz. Una porción grande de la población siente que el proceso de paz implica pocos cambios para su vida, y entre aquellos que esperan cambios aproximadamente la mitad tienen expectativas positivas y el restante negativas. Los que viven en áreas con mayor presencia de grupos armados tienden a ser menos indiferentes, pero no son simplemente más pesimistas o más optimistas. La mayoría de los encuestados reportan poca resistencia a tener ex-combatientes como vecinos o empleados, pero rechazan relativamente más la participación política y financiar los beneficios para los rebeldes (dos aspectos cruciales del acuerdo de paz).

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Eslava & Leopoldo Fergusson & Andrés Moya, 2017. "Política y Reconciliación: Una coyuntura crítica para la construcción de Estado," Documentos CEDE 15895, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:015895
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/8867/dcede2017-68.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acemoglu, Daron, 2005. "Politics and economics in weak and strong states," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1199-1226, October.
    2. Stokes, Susan C., 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 315-325, August.
    3. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos Molina & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2018. "I Sell My Vote, and So What? Incidence, Social Bias, and Correlates of Clientelism in Colombia," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2018), pages 181-218, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos A. Molina & James A. Robinson, 2022. "The Weak State Trap," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(354), pages 293-331, April.
    2. Francisco Eslava & Leopoldo Fergusson & Andrés Moya, 2017. "Politics and reconciliation: A critical juncture for state building," Documentos CEDE 15896, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    3. Leopoldo Fergusson & Horacio Larreguy & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2022. "Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(648), pages 2815-2834.
    4. Leopoldo Fergusson, 2019. "Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, vol. 38(78), pages 671-700, November.
    5. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos Molina & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2019. "Consumers as VAT “Evaders”: Incidence, Social Bias, and Correlates in Colombia," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 21-67, April.
    6. Leopoldo Fergusson & Arturo Harker & Carlos Molina & Juan Camilo Yamín, 2023. "Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students," Documentos CEDE 20732, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    7. Gallego, Jorge & Guardado, Jenny & Wantchekon, Leonard, 2023. "Do gifts buy votes? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    8. Lehmann, M. Christian & Matarazzo, Hellen, 2019. "Voters’ response to in-kind transfers: Quasi-experimental evidence from prescription drug cost-sharing in Brazil," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    9. Gustavo J. Bobonis & Paul J. Gertler & Marco Gonzalez-Navarro & Simeon Nichter, 2022. "Vulnerability and Clientelism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(11), pages 3627-3659, November.
    10. Ardanaz, Martín & Leiras, Marcelo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2012. "The Politics of Federalism in Argentina: Implications for Governance and Accountability," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3977, Inter-American Development Bank.
    11. Bardhan, Pranab, 2022. "Clientelism and governance," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    12. Yu Hao & Kevin Zhengcheng Liu, 2020. "Taxation, fiscal capacity, and credible commitment in eighteenth‐century China: the effects of the formalization and centralization of informal surtaxes," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 73(4), pages 914-939, November.
    13. Pedro Naso & Erwin Bulte & Tim Swanson, 2017. "Can there be benefits from competing legal regimes? The impact of legal pluralism in post-conflict Sierra Leone," CIES Research Paper series 56-2017, Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute.
    14. Nicole M. Mason & Thomas S. Jayne & Nicolas van de Walle, 2017. "The Political Economy of Fertilizer Subsidy Programs in Africa: Evidence from Zambia," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 99(3), pages 705-731.
    15. Robert Akerlof & Hongyi Li & Jonathan Yeo, 2022. "Ruling the Roost: The Vicious Circle and the Emergence of Pecking Order," Discussion Papers 2023-03, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    16. Hicken, Allen & Leider, Stephen & Ravanilla, Nico & Yang, Dean, 2018. "Temptation in vote-selling: Evidence from a field experiment in the Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 1-14.
    17. Miquel Pellicer & Eva Wegner & Lindsay J. Benstead & Ellen Lust, 2021. "Poor people’s beliefs and the dynamics of clientelism," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(3), pages 300-332, July.
    18. Jeremy Bowles & Horacio Larreguy & Shelley Liu, 2020. "How Weakly Institutionalized Parties Monitor Brokers in Developing Democracies: Evidence from Postconflict Liberia," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(4), pages 952-967, October.
    19. Bartnicki, Sławomir & Alimowski, Maciej & Górecki, Maciej A., 2022. "The anomalous electoral advantage: Evidence from over 17,000 mayoral candidacies in Poland," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    20. Joachim Voth, 2013. "Tightening Tensions: Fiscal Policy and Civil Unrest in South America, 1937–95," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Jordi Galí (ed.),Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Performance, edition 1, volume 17, chapter 3, pages 59-92, Central Bank of Chile.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Clientelismo; evasión de impuestos; conflicto; estado;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000089:015895. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Universidad De Los Andes-Cede (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceandco.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.