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Институциональные Ловушки: Есть Ли Выход?
[Institutional Traps: Is There a Way Out?]

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Abstract

Any legislative framework is likely to generate different institutions or norms of behavior which the legislator occasionally could have never foreseen. I suggested a general pattern, on which inefficient, if stable, norms or institutions called institutional traps would form.

Suggested Citation

  • Polterovich, Victor, 2004. "Институциональные Ловушки: Есть Ли Выход?
    [Institutional Traps: Is There a Way Out?]
    ," MPRA Paper 22071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:22071
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22071/1/MPRA_paper_22071.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zak, Paul J & Knack, Stephen, 2001. "Trust and Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 295-321, April.
    2. Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
    3. A. Chong & C. Calderón, 2000. "Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 69-81, March.
    4. Polterovich, Victor, 2000. "Civic Culture and Economic Transition in Russia," MPRA Paper 20068, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Drazen, Allan & Grilli, Vittorio, 1993. "The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 598-607, June.
    6. Uribe, Martin, 1997. "Hysteresis in a simple model of currency substitution," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 185-202, September.
    7. Polterovich, Victor, 2007. "Institutional Trap," MPRA Paper 20595, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Polterovich, Victor, 2001. "Rent Seeking, Tax Policy, and Economic Growth," MPRA Paper 20058, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    coordination failures; corruption; cultural inertia; institutional trap; multiple equilibria; path dependence; rent seeking; reputation; systemic crises; transaction costs; transformation costs; transitional rent; trust;

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • P30 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
    • P20 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - General

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