Институциональные Ловушки: Есть Ли Выход?
[Institutional Traps: Is There a Way Out?]
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordscoordination failures; corruption; cultural inertia; institutional trap; multiple equilibria; path dependence; rent seeking; reputation; systemic crises; transaction costs; transformation costs; transitional rent; trust;
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- P30 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
- P20 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - General
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