Институциональные Ловушки: Есть Ли Выход?
[Institutional Traps: Is There a Way Out?]
Any legislative framework is likely to generate different institutions or norms of behavior which the legislator occasionally could have never foreseen. I suggested a general pattern, on which inefficient, if stable, norms or institutions called institutional traps would form.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Obschestvennye nauki i sovremennost' 3 (2004): pp. 5-16|
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