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Институциональные Ловушки: Есть Ли Выход?
[Institutional Traps: Is There a Way Out?]

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  • Polterovich, Victor

Abstract

Any legislative framework is likely to generate different institutions or norms of behavior which the legislator occasionally could have never foreseen. I suggested a general pattern, on which inefficient, if stable, norms or institutions called institutional traps would form.

Suggested Citation

  • Polterovich, Victor, 2004. "Институциональные Ловушки: Есть Ли Выход? [Institutional Traps: Is There a Way Out?]," MPRA Paper 22071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:22071
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zak, Paul J & Knack, Stephen, 2001. "Trust and Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 295-321, April.
    2. Polterovich, Victor, 2000. "Civic Culture and Economic Transition in Russia," MPRA Paper 20068, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Uribe, Martin, 1997. "Hysteresis in a simple model of currency substitution," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 185-202, September.
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    8. Drazen, Allan & Grilli, Vittorio, 1993. "The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 598-607, June.
    9. Polterovich, Victor, 2007. "Institutional Trap," MPRA Paper 20595, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Polterovich, Victor, 2001. "Rent Seeking, Tax Policy, and Economic Growth," MPRA Paper 20058, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    coordination failures; corruption; cultural inertia; institutional trap; multiple equilibria; path dependence; rent seeking; reputation; systemic crises; transaction costs; transformation costs; transitional rent; trust;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • P30 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
    • P20 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - General

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