Corruption, Transparency and Quality.Comparative Approaches and Judiciary Support
The paper aims to achieve a synthesis of the systemic connections between corruption, transparency and quality of the public services. Situated at the interface between public and private, corruption has the political and administrative environments as important determinations. Based on a series of papers from the area of corruption economics, the paper proposes a model of corruption dependency related to the political stability/instability as well as relevant comparisons concerning the social perception on corruption. Approaching corruption and transparency from the perspective of the public integrity systems, based on a recent country study concerning Romania, the paper presents the corruption profile as well as a series of conclusions concerning the „integrity pillars” with special reference to the Parliament, Executive, Judiciary, Public administration etc. The aspects presented are leading to the conclusion that corruption influences seriously the quality of the public services. The imminent integration of Romania into the European Union determines sustained efforts of the public authorities from Romania in order to complete the legislative support of the anticorruption actions. These efforts are expressed in new normative deeds, aimed to fight against the power abuse, law breaking and fraud under all forms.
|Date of creation:||15 May 2006|
|Date of revision:||20 Dec 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- Filipe Campante & Davin Chor & Quoc-Anh Do, .
"Instability and the Incentives for Corruption,"
248201, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Campante, Filipe Robin & Chor, Davin & Do, Quoc-Anh, 2009. "Instability and the Incentives for Corruption," Scholarly Articles 4778510, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Filipe R. Campante & Davin Chor & Quoc-Anh Do, 2009. "Instability and the Incentives for Corruption," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/o45fqtltm96, Sciences Po.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 1999. "Competition and corruption in an agency relationship," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 271-295, December.
- Fredriksson, Per G. & Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Political instability, corruption and policy formation: the case of environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1383-1405, August.
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