Anti-corruption strategies in some South-Eastern European states.An empirical study on the impact of the government performance
The preoccupations about conceiving and promoting efficient anti-corruption strategies exist in most states, especially in the developing countries. The opportunity of such strategies derives from the direct link, demonstrated theoretically and empirically, between the effects of the anti-corruption strategies and government performance, translated both in the economic and social results and living standard, welfare etc. In the last decades, the transnational actors – UN, World Bank, OECD, EU etc. - have affirmed as promoters of own anti-corruption strategies, directing the states’ efforts, conferring adequate levels of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency or sustainability. The South-Eastern European states incorporate own anti-corruption strategies in the framework of general strategies, aiming the government reform in the context of the European integration process. Strengthening the public integrity, reducing corruption, developing a genuine climate of economic freedom become important objectives concerning the impact on government performance. The paper incorporates briefly the main characteristics of anti-corruption strategies, developed by transnational actors and it aims to shape theoretical and empirical frameworks for the impact of anti-corruption strategies. The focus on some South-Eastern European states has a demonstrative character, as the presented analyses may be extended to various geo-political areas.
|Date of creation:||20 Aug 2010|
|Date of revision:||01 Sep 2010|
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