Post-Crisis Financial Security Architecture in the Face of the 2023 Crisis Episode

The aim of this article is to analyse the 2023 crisis episode - the failures of regional US banks - from the perspective of the effectiveness of the post-crisis financial safety architecture developed in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Drawing on a review of the literature and regulatory documents, the article reconstructs the sequence of events, identifies their causes, and confronts them with the paradigms underlying modern banking supervision. The analysis shows that the banks involved in the crisis episode met their capital requirements and, in many cases, their liquidity requirements as well. The source of the problems lay in qualitative factors: poor risk management, unsustainable business models, and inadequate supervision. The episode also revealed a new mechanics of banking crises - social media and digital banking compressed the timeline of deposit runs from days to hours, fundamentally altering the dynamics of tail risk events. The article's main conclusion is that the existing regulatory framework, built on the paradigm of normally distributed phenomena and quantitative risk measures, is ill-suited to this new reality. Distribution tails are fatter, and future crises may be more violent and harder to contain than previously assumed. The 2023 episode, though limited in scale, should be treated as a warning signal for the financial safety system as a whole.