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The Character of Spider-Man: Ethics and Greed in a General Equilibrium Model

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  • Loureiro, Paulo Roberto Amorim

Abstract

This paper develops a general equilibrium model in which ethics and greed coexist as opposing forces shaping social and economic stability. Individuals choose be- tween legal and illicit effort, while ethical agents internalize a moral cost, and the government sets enforcement and penalties. The dynamic interaction between moral restraint, institutional enforcement, and social respect determines the aggregate equilibrium. The model shows that, in the absence of virtue or enforcement, greed dominates and equilibrium collapses; yet, when moral costs or public integrity poli- cies rise, the economy converges to a stable and more equitable state. Mathematical stability is derived from Jury’s conditions, and an empirical strategy is proposed to test these mechanisms using crime, enforcement, and social capital data. Ultimately, morality emerges as an endogenous economic variable—an efficient complement to law, rather than its substitute.

Suggested Citation

  • Loureiro, Paulo Roberto Amorim, 2025. "The Character of Spider-Man: Ethics and Greed in a General Equilibrium Model," MPRA Paper 126613, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:126613
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Levitt, Steven D, 1997. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 270-290, June.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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