Structure versus Agency in the Great Deprivation of 21st Century
Agency-based explanations of the great deprivation, contrasted with structure-based explanations, suffer not merely from the criticism of relying on irrational and irresponsible behavior of millions, including that of the most astute financial experts, but are also at a loss to explain why such problems did not arise earlier when the same motivations and behavioral patterns were exhibited, thereby rendering such theories incomplete. Alternatively, if it is argued that such problems did not appear earlier because the economic structure was different then, then again attention must return to an examination of structure, not exclusively place blame on agency failures. (98 words)
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- Peter Neary, 1988. "Tariffs, Quotas, and Voluntary Export Restraints with and without Internationally Mobile Capital," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(4), pages 714-35, November.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Felton, Andrew, 2008. "The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century," MPRA Paper 11862, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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