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The Debate on the Sustainability of Social Spending

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  • d'Andria, Diego

Abstract

The economic and political debate in countries with older industrialization faces a progressive growth of social spending in relation to national products, generated by a concurrence of factors (aging of populations, low productivity in human services, moral hazard), which leads to propose reductions of social spending in favor of other resource allocations. Social expenditures, however, constitute an essential part of the “social pact” which historically united citizens in accepting equalities in political rights and inequalities in the command over resources. The question on the “sustainability” of the choices regarding social policies is open, with regards to the acceptability of economic inequalities and in relation to the ethical themes founded on the recognition of human dignity.

Suggested Citation

  • d'Andria, Diego, 2008. "The Debate on the Sustainability of Social Spending," MPRA Paper 11745, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11745
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sustainability of social spending;

    JEL classification:

    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs

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