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A Nash equilibrium against gun control

Author

Listed:
  • Saccal, Alessandro

Abstract

This work constructs a non-cooperative, static game of gun control between the citizen and a pacifistic society characterised by law enforcement imperfection, by which the retention of firearms and the certitude of punishment against all crimes emerges both as a strict Nash equilibrium, in pure strategies, and as a strict dominant strategy equilibrium. The reason is that ratified by the Second Amendment to the American Constitution, discerning the necessity of a militia to the individual and societal security of a free state, by which the right of the people to keep and bear arms cannot be infringed.

Suggested Citation

  • Saccal, Alessandro, 2022. "A Nash equilibrium against gun control," MPRA Paper 115213, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:115213
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/115213/1/MPRA_paper_115213.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McDonald, John F., 1999. "An economic analysis of guns, crime, and gun control," Journal of Criminal Justice, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 11-19, January.
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    3. Chaudhri, Vivek & Geanakoplos, John, 1998. "A note on the economic rationalization of gun control," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 51-53, January.
    4. Yuri M Zhukov, 2016. "Taking away the guns," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 53(2), pages 242-258, March.
    5. Bernd Hayo & Florian Neumeier & Christian Westphal, 2019. "The social costs of gun ownership revisited," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 1-12, January.
    6. David C. Vitt & Alexander F. McQuoid & Charles Moore & Stephen Sawyer, 2018. "Trigger warning: the causal impact of gun ownership on suicide," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(53), pages 5747-5765, November.
    7. Mark Duggan, 2001. "More Guns, More Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1086-1114, October.
    8. Mialon, Hugo M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2005. "The impact of gun laws: A model of crime and self-defense," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 170-175, August.
    9. Cook, Philip J. & Ludwig, Jens, 2006. "The social costs of gun ownership," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 379-391, January.
    10. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 521-565, May-June.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K39 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Other
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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