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Estimating Possible Subsidy Effects in Broadband Services and Deployment

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  • Mohammadi, Mohammad Ali

Abstract

In this work, the dynamic competition between firms providing internet services is studied. The framework is Markov equilibrium whereby structural parameters are obtained using two-step estimations, allowing for analyzing the situation in case of subsidies for service upgrade. The results show that such subsidy has little effect on the number of firms while increasing the number of fast firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohammadi, Mohammad Ali, 2021. "Estimating Possible Subsidy Effects in Broadband Services and Deployment," MPRA Paper 111962, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:111962
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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