IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/110434.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Expert-based Knowledge: Communicating over Scientific Models

Author

Listed:
  • Colo, Philippe

Abstract

Scientific models structure our perception of reality. This paper studies how we choose among them under expert advise. Scientific models are formalised as probability distributions over possible scenarios. An expert is assumed to know the most likely model and seeks to communicate it to a decision maker, but cannot prove it. As a result, communication is a cheap talk game over models. The decision maker is in a situation of model-uncertainty and is ambiguity sensitive. I show that information transmission depends on the strategic misalignment of players and, unlike similar models in the literature, a form of consensus among scientific models. When science is divided, there is an asymmetry in information transmission when the receiver has maxmin expected utility preferences. No information can be conveyed over models above a certain threshold. All equilibria of the game are outcome equivalent to a partitional equilibria and the most informative one is interim Pareto dominant.

Suggested Citation

  • Colo, Philippe, 2021. "Expert-based Knowledge: Communicating over Scientific Models," MPRA Paper 110434, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:110434
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/110434/1/MPRA_paper_110434.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/110489/8/MPRA_paper_110489.pdf
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/110488/1/MPRA_paper_110488.pdf
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lars Peter Hansen & Thomas J Sargent, 2014. "Robust Control and Model Misspecification," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: UNCERTAINTY WITHIN ECONOMIC MODELS, chapter 6, pages 155-216, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Joshua Schwartzstein & Adi Sunderam, 2021. "Using Models to Persuade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(1), pages 276-323, January.
    3. Gajdos, T. & Hayashi, T. & Tallon, J.-M. & Vergnaud, J.-C., 2008. "Attitude toward imprecise information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 27-65, May.
    4. Ghirardato, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo, 2004. "Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 133-173, October.
    5. Ying Chen & Navin Kartik & Joel Sobel, 2008. "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(1), pages 117-136, January.
    6. Eran Hanany & Peter Klibanoff & Sujoy Mukerji, 2020. "Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 135-187, May.
    7. Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T., 2017. "Modes of ambiguous communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 271-292.
    8. Peter Klibanoff & Massimo Marinacci & Sujoy Mukerji, 2005. "A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1849-1892, November.
    9. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    10. Lars Peter Hansen & Thomas J Sargent, 2014. "Robust Control and Model Uncertainty," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: UNCERTAINTY WITHIN ECONOMIC MODELS, chapter 5, pages 145-154, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    11. Ghirardato, Paolo & Marinacci, Massimo, 2002. "Ambiguity Made Precise: A Comparative Foundation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 251-289, February.
    12. Loïc Berger & Nicolas Berger & Valentina Bosetti & Itzhak Gilboa & Lars Peter Hansen & Christopher Jarvis & Massimo Marinacci & Richard D. Smith, 2020. "Uncertainty and decision-making during a crisis: How to make policy decisions in the COVID-19 context?," Working Papers 666, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    13. Antony Millner & Simon Dietz & Geoffrey Heal, 2013. "Scientific Ambiguity and Climate Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 55(1), pages 21-46, May.
    14. Daniel Ellsberg, 1961. "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 75(4), pages 643-669.
    15. Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T., 2018. "Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 1-17.
    16. Isaiah Andrews & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2021. "A Model of Scientific Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(5), pages 2117-2142, September.
    17. Mohammed Abdellaoui & Philippe Colo & Brian Hill, 2021. "Eliciting Multiple Prior Beliefs," Working Papers hal-03501733, HAL.
    18. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Sylvain Chassang & Sergio Montero & Erik Snowberg, 2020. "A Theory of Experimenters: Robustness, Randomization, and Balance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(4), pages 1206-1230, April.
    19. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    20. Neil M. Ferguson & Matt J. Keeling & W. John Edmunds & Raymond Gani & Bryan T. Grenfell & Roy M. Anderson & Steve Leach, 2003. "Planning for smallpox outbreaks," Nature, Nature, vol. 425(6959), pages 681-685, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T. & Riener, Gerhard, 2022. "Reacting to ambiguous messages: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 360-378.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hill, Brian, 2023. "Beyond uncertainty aversion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 196-222.
    2. Brian Hill, 2009. "Confidence and ambiguity," Working Papers hal-00489870, HAL.
    3. Karni, Edi & Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo, 2015. "Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    4. Jewitt, Ian & Mukerji, Sujoy, 2017. "Ordering ambiguous acts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 213-267.
    5. Loïc Berger & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2021. "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Value of Diversification," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1639-1647, March.
    6. Matthew Kovach, 2024. "Ambiguity and partial Bayesian updating," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(1), pages 155-180, August.
    7. Loïc Berger & Massimo Marinacci, 2020. "Model Uncertainty in Climate Change Economics: A Review and Proposed Framework for Future Research," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(3), pages 475-501, November.
    8. Chateauneuf, Alain & Faro, José Heleno, 2009. "Ambiguity through confidence functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 535-558, September.
    9. Peter Klibanoff & Sujoy Mukerji & Kyoungwon Seo, 2014. "Perceived Ambiguity and Relevant Measures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(5), pages 1945-1978, September.
    10. Hill, Brian, 2013. "Confidence and decision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 675-692.
    11. Beauchêne, Dorian & Li, Jian & Li, Ming, 2019. "Ambiguous persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 312-365.
    12. Moti Michaeli, 2014. "Riskiness for sets of gambles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 515-547, August.
    13. Loïc Berger & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2020. "Risk, Ambiguity, And The Value Of Diversification," Working Papers hal-02910906, HAL.
    14. Loic Berger & Massimo Marinacci, 2017. "Model Uncertainty in Climate Change Economics," Working Papers 616, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    15. Eisei Ohtaki, 2023. "Optimality in an OLG model with nonsmooth preferences," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(3), pages 611-659, September.
    16. Massimo Marinacci, 2015. "Model Uncertainty," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 13(6), pages 1022-1100, December.
    17. Jingyi Xue, 2020. "Preferences with changing ambiguity aversion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(1), pages 1-60, February.
    18. Junyi Chai & Zhiquan Weng & Wenbin Liu, 2021. "Behavioral Decision Making in Normative and Descriptive Views: A Critical Review of Literature," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(10), pages 1-14, October.
    19. Marciano Siniscalchi, 2009. "Vector Expected Utility and Attitudes Toward Variation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(3), pages 801-855, May.
    20. Larry G Epstein & Yoram Halevy, 2024. "Hard-to-Interpret Signals," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 393-427.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ambiguity; cheap talk;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:110434. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.