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The Global Protection Organisation (GPO) - A Proposal to Improve the Handling of Global Challenges

Author

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  • van Suntum, Ulrich

Abstract

The paper proposes a new approach for making global contracts, mainly based on the Coase-theorem. In particular, it is argued that combining several, normally unrelated issues to a bargaining bundle could facilitate Pareto-efficient contracts that benefit all, even including future generations. For this ends, a new institution called Global Protection Agency (GPO) is suggested that should be organized quite similar to the WTO, however with a much larger scope of competences.A formal model is used to demonstrate how this could work.

Suggested Citation

  • van Suntum, Ulrich, 2021. "The Global Protection Organisation (GPO) - A Proposal to Improve the Handling of Global Challenges," MPRA Paper 108984, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:108984
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/108984/1/MPRA_paper_108984.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McKelvey, Richard D. & Page, Talbot, 1999. "Taking the Coase Theorem Seriously," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 235-247, October.
    2. Dixit, Avinash & Olson, Mancur, 2000. "Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 309-335, June.
    3. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    4. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
    5. Hoekman, Bernard M. & Kostecki, Michel M., 2009. "The Political Economy of the World Trading System," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 3, number 9780199553778.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    JEL classification:

    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General

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