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Stronger Patent Regime, Innovation and Scientist Mobility

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  • Ganguly, Madhuparna

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of a stronger patent regime on innovation incentives, patenting propensity and scientist mobility when an innovating firm can partially recover its damage due to scientist movement from the infringing rival. The strength of the patent system, which is a function of litigation success probability and damage recovery proportion, stipulates expected indemnification. We show that stronger patents fail to reduce the likelihood of infringement and further, decrease the innovation's expected profitability. Higher potential reparation also reduces the scientist's expected return on R&D knowledge, entailing greater R&D investment. Our results suggest important considerations for patent reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Ganguly, Madhuparna, 2021. "Stronger Patent Regime, Innovation and Scientist Mobility," MPRA Paper 107635, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:107635
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    1. Ganguly, Madhuparna, 2021. "Competition and Innovation: the effects of scientist mobility and stronger patent rights," MPRA Paper 107831, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Damage rules; Infringement; Patent strength; Scientist mobility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - General
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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