The Growth Effects of National Patent Policies
We construct a two-country (innovative North and imitating South) model of product-cycle trade, fully endogenous Schumpeterian growth, and national patent policies. A move towards harmonization based on stronger Southern intellectual property rights (IPR) protection accelerates the long-run global rates of innovation and growth, reduces the North-South wage gap, and has an ambiguous effect on the rate of international technology transfer. Patent harmonization constitutes a suboptimal global-growth policy. However, if the global economy is governed by a common patent policy regime, then stronger global IPR protection: (a) increases the rates of global innovation and growth; (b) accelerates the rate of international technology transfer; and (c) has no impact on the North-South wage gap. Copyright © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 16 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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