Institutional Change, Competitive Pressure And Over-Influential Proffessors: The New Japanese Bar Examination
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References listed on IDEAS
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
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KeywordsCompetitive pressure; Japanese bar examination;
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-09-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2008-09-05 (Education)
- NEP-LAW-2008-09-05 (Law & Economics)
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