The men who weren't even there: Legislative voting with absentees
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- Laszlo A. Koczy & Miklos Pinter, 2011. "The men who weren't even there: Legislative voting with absentees," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1129, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
References listed on IDEAS
- van Deemen, Adrian & Rusinowska, Agnieszka, 2003. "Paradoxes of Voting Power in Dutch Politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(1-2), pages 109-137, April.
- René van den Brink, 2002.
"An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(3), pages 309-319.
- van den Brink, J.R., 1999. "An Axiomatization of the Shapley Value Using a Fairness Property," Discussion Paper 1999-120, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Ines Lindner, 2008. "A Special Case of Penrose’s Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 64(4), pages 495-518, June.
- Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2010. "Quaternary dichotomous voting rules," IKERLANAK 2010-41, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
- Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
- MoshÊ Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 1997. "Ternary Voting Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 335-351.
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More about this item
Keywordsa priori voting power; power index; being absent from voting; minority; Shapley-Shubik index; Shapley value;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2011-07-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2011-07-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2011-07-02 (Positive Political Economics)
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