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A Review of Build-Operate-Transfer for Infrastructure Development: Some Lessons for Policy Reform

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  • Llanto, Gilberto M.

Abstract

The Philippines has used the BOT law, as amended to motivate private sector provision of infrastructure. Using examples from selected BOT projects in the country, the paper points out key issues constraining the successful implementation of the BOT approach to infrastructure provision. It also indicates several factors that were instrumental in forging an effective public-private partnership in BOT projects. The paper points out the need to address various issues, starting from the legal framework to the level of responsibilities of the government institutions that are involved in the project cycle, i.e., from project entry level to implementation and completion. Improvements should be introduced at the policy, legal, and institutional frameworks in order to improve the usefulness of this approach to infrastructure development.

Suggested Citation

  • Llanto, Gilberto M., 2008. "A Review of Build-Operate-Transfer for Infrastructure Development: Some Lessons for Policy Reform," Discussion Papers DP 2008-25, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:phd:dpaper:dp_2008-25
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.62986/dp2008.25
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    File URL: https://www.pids.gov.ph/publication/discussion-papers/a-review-of-build-operate-transfer-for-infrastructure-development-some-lessons-for-policy-reform
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Balisacan, Arsenio M. & Hill, Hal (ed.), 2003. "The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195158984.
    2. Augenblick, Mark & Custer, B. Scott, 1990. "The build, operate, and transfer ("BOT") approach to infrastructure projects in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 498, The World Bank.
    3. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Llanto, Gilberto M., 2012. "The Impact of Infrastructure on Agricultural Productivity," Discussion Papers DP 2012-12, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
    2. Durdyev, Serdar & Ismail, Syuhaida, 2017. "The build-operate-transfer model as an infrastructure privatisation strategy for Turkmenistan," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 195-200.

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