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Deception and Mutual Trust: A Reply to Strudler

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Abstract

Alan Strudler has written a stimulating and provocative article about deception in negotiation. He presents his views, in part, in contrast with our earlier work on the Mutual Trust Perspective. We believe that Strudler is wrong in his account of the ethics of deception in negotiation and in his quick dismissal of the Mutual Trust Perspective. Though his mistakes may be informative, his views are potentially harmful to business practice. In this paper, we present arguments against Strudler's position and attempt to salvage the Mutual-Trust Perspective from his attack. Strudler's work reaffirms the need for a more pragmatic approach to business ethics. We close the paper with a renewed call for more constructive and practical approaches to business ethics research.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees, 1995. "Deception and Mutual Trust: A Reply to Strudler," Papers of Peter Cramton 95beq, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
    • Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:95beq
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    1. Gregory Dees, J. & Cramton, Peter C., 1991. "Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality In Practice," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 135-167, April.
    2. Cramton, Peter C. & Dees, J. Gregory, 1993. "Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(4), pages 359-394, October.
    3. Strudler, Alan, 1995. "On the Ethics of Deception in Negotiation," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(4), pages 805-822, October.
    4. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Signaling; Negotiations; Business Ethics; Private Information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • M29 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Other

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