Collusion And Price Dispersion
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 2004.
"Collusion and Price Rigidity,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 317-349.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 1998. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Working papers 98-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000081, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Borenstein, Severin & Rose, Nancy L, 1994.
"Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 653-683, August.
- Severin Borenstein & Nancy L. Rose, 1991. "Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry," NBER Working Papers 3785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2013. "Actions Speak Louder than Words: Econometric Evidence to Target Tacit Collusion in Oligopolistic Markets," Discussion Papers in Economics 16179, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Korbinian Blanckenburg & Alexander Geist, 2009. "How Can a Cartel Be Detected?," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 15(4), pages 421-436, November.
- Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2015.
"Endogenous price commitment, sticky and leadership pricing: Evidence from the Italian petrol market,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 32-48.
- Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2013. "Endogenous Price Commitment, Sticky and Leadership Pricing: Evidence from the Italian Petrol Market," Discussion Papers in Economics 16182, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Yuliya Bolotova & Christopher S. McIntosh & Paul E. Patterson & Kalamani Muthusamy, 2010. "Is stabilization of potato price effective? Empirical evidence from the Idaho Russet Burbank potato market," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(2), pages 177-201.
- repec:kap:iaecre:v:15:y:2009:i:4:p:421-436 is not listed on IDEAS
- Juan Jiménez & Jordi Perdiguero, 2012. "Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(3), pages 223-248, November.
- Ofer H. Azar, 2013. "Firm strategy and biased decision making: the price dispersion puzzle," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(7), pages 901-910, March.
- Bolotova, Yuliya & Connor, John M. & Miller, Douglas J., 2008.
"The impact of collusion on price behavior: Empirical results from two recent cases,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1290-1307, November.
- Bolotova, Yuliya & Connor, John M. & Miller, Douglas J., 2005. "The Impact of Collusion on Price Behavior: Empirical Results from Two Recent Cases," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19164, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Li Gan & Manuel A. Hernandez, 2013.
"Making Friends with Your Neighbors? Agglomeration and Tacit Collusion in The Lodging Industry,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 1002-1017, July.
- Li Gan & Manuel A. Hernandez, 2011. "Making friends with your neighbors? Agglomeration and tacit collusion in the lodging industry," NBER Working Papers 16739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Korbinian von Blanckenburg & Marc Hanfeld & Konstantin A. Kholodilin, 2013. "A Market Screening Model for Price Inconstancies: Empirical Evidence from German Electricity Markets," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1274, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. & Froeb, Luke M. & Geweke, John & Taylor, Christopher T., 2006. "A variance screen for collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 467-486, May.
- Gu, Gyun Cheol, 2012. "Denial, Rationalization, and the Administered Price Thesis," MPRA Paper 42594, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
Keywordscollusion; cartel; price dispersion;
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pae:wpaper:04-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Debby Weber). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dapurus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.