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Quelques resultats sur l`effet des transferts cibles

Author

Listed:
  • Valerie Lechene
  • Martin Browning
  • Pierre-Andre Chiappori

Abstract

Allocations familiales et autres transferts cibles sont generalement verses aux meres, sur la base de l`observation qu`augmenter la part des ressources controlees par les meres conduit a ameliorer le bien-etre des enfants. Nous recensons un ensemble de resultats empiriques qui etablisent le bien-fonde de ces mesures. Nous contrastons ensuite les predictions theoriques des principales alternatives au modele standard de comportement des menages, le modele unitaire. Ceci permet d`etablir que l`effet predit des transferts depend des preferences individuelles et du pouvoir des membres du menage, mais aussi crucialement de la forme des interactions dans le menage.

Suggested Citation

  • Valerie Lechene & Martin Browning & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2006. "Quelques resultats sur l`effet des transferts cibles," Economics Series Working Papers 294, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:294
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211.
    2. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 2010. "Distributional Effects in Household Models: Separate Spheres and Income Pooling," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(545), pages 786-799, June.
    3. Richard Blundell & Pierre-André Chiappori & Costas Meghir, 2005. "Collective Labor Supply with Children," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(6), pages 1277-1306, December.
    4. Valérie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2005. "Household Nash equilibrium with voluntarily contributed public goods," IFS Working Papers W05/06, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    5. Thomas, Duncan & Contreras, Dante & Frankerberg, Elizabeth, 2002. "Distribution of power within the household and child health," MPRA Paper 80075, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2002.
    6. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transferts Cibles; Equilibre de Nash; Modele Collectif; Solution de Nash; Allocation Intra-Familiale; Mise en Commun des Ressources; Spheres Separees;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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