An effect of consumer's earlier decision to purchase a discount ticket
In this article, we consider how effect consumer's earlier decision to purchase a discount ticket will have on the competition, price and timetable, between airlines. We focus on a relationship between consumer's purchasing behavior and a competition between airlines. We consider that a consumer can purchase a ticket two times, i.e. ex-ante and ex-post, corresponding to this timing, airlines also can set their prices of tickets. The main conclusion highlighted by this article is that, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, each airline's expected profit is unique and timetable is socially optimal regardless to a consumer's purchasing behavior.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||14 Feb 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Discussion paper series (2011), 131: 1-8|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 3-5-21 Midori, Otaru, 047-8501|
Web page: http://www.otaru-uc.ac.jp/dept/econ/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gaggero, Alberto A. & Piga, Claudio A., 2010.
"Airline competition in the British Isles,"
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review,
Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 270-279, March.
- Jan Brueckner & Ricardo Flores-Fillol, 2007. "Airline Schedule Competition," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 30(3), pages 161-177, May.
- Encacoua, D. & Moreaux, M. & Perrot, A., 1995.
"Compatibility and Competition in Airlines: Demand Side Network Effect,"
Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications
95.21, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Encaoua, David & Moreaux, Michel & Perrot, Anne, 1996. "Compatibility and competition in airlines demand side network effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 701-726, October.
- Greenhut,Melvin L. & Norman,George & Hung,Chao-Shun, 1987. "The Economics of Imperfect Competition," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521315647, December.
- Jan K. Brueckner, 2004.
"Network Structure and Airline Scheduling,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 291-312, 06.
- d'Aspremont, C & Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold & Thisse, J-F, 1979.
"On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition","
Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1145-50, September.
- Schipper, Youdi & Rietveld, Piet & Nijkamp, Peter, 2003. "Airline deregulation and external costs: a welfare analysis," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 699-718, September.
- Salvanes, Kjell G. & Steen, Frode & Sorgard, Lars, 2005. "Hotelling in the air? Flight departures in Norway," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 193-213, March.
- Greenhut,Melvin L. & Norman,George & Hung,Chao-Shun, 1987. "The Economics of Imperfect Competition," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521305525, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ota:busdis:10252/4502. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Miura, Chiho)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.