Coordination Behavior and Optimal Committee Size
How many members should committees consist of? This paper addresses this question in view of imperfect information and coordination behavior among the members, which is a new approach alternative to introducing information acquisition cost. First, using a simple model, I show that the existence of the coordination motive dismisses Condorcet fs (1785) suggestion and the finite optimal size of the committee is determined. Second, I provide an application of the mechanism to monetary policy committees in a basic New Keynesian model. This example will inspire other applications to policy issues in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2010|
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|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/e_HP/e_g_shiryo.html|
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- Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
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