Information Aggregation and Innovation in Market Design
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2011. "Targeting in advertising markets: implications for offline versus online media," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 417-443, September.
- Xavier Vives, 2007. "Information and Learning in Markets," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001520, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Easley,David & Kleinberg,Jon, 2010. "Networks, Crowds, and Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521195331, May.
More about this item
KeywordsInterdependent values and noise; Network; Link Formation; Innovation; Information Aggregation; Divisible Good Auction; Commonality;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:1112. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nicholas Economides). General contact details of provider: http://www.NETinst.org/ .