Information Aggregation and Innovation in Market Design
The literature on information aggregation predicts that market growth unambiguously reduces uncertainty about the value of traded goods. The results were developed within the classical model, which assumes that traders’ values for the exchanged good are determined by fundamental (common) shocks. At the same time, design innovation in contemporaneous markets seems to exploit demand interdependence among agents with similar tastes or common information sharing (e.g., Facebook ads, the practice of customer targeting). This paper demonstrates that with heterogeneous interdependence among agents’ values or noise in signals about values, opportunities to innovate in smaller or less connected (in the network-theoretic sense) markets may dominate those in larger or better connected markets.
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- Easley,David & Kleinberg,Jon, 2010. "Networks, Crowds, and Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521195331, June.
- Xavier Vives, 2007. "Information and Learning in Markets," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001520, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2011. "Targeting in advertising markets: implications for offline versus online media," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 417-443, 09.
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