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Charles Goodhart's Contributions to the History of Monetary Institutions

  • Michael D. Bordo
  • Anna J. Schwartz

Our paper examines Charles Goodhart's work on the history of monetary institutions: central bank operations under the gold standard, their behaviour in relation to the financial system in which they functioned, including their responses to banking crises, and their performance as lenders of last resort. Although we differ with Charles on some of the conclusions that he has reached, we pay tribute to his importance in shaping the discussion by economists over a thirty-year span on questions related to the functioning of banks, their customers, and the historic central banks that evolved from serving government to serving banks.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w8717.pdf
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 8717.

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Date of creation: Jan 2002
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Publication status: published as Mizen, Paul (ed.) Essays in honour of Charles Goodhart. Volume 2. Monetary history, exchange rates and financial markets. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, MA: Elgar, 2003.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8717
Note: DAE ME
Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
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  1. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October.
  2. Giovannini, Alberto, 1986. "`Rules of the game' during the International Gold Standard: England and Germany," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 467-483, December.
  3. Haizhou Huang & Charles Goodhart, 1999. "A Simple Model of an International Lender of Last Resort," FMG Discussion Papers dp336, Financial Markets Group.
  4. Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, 1988. "Financial deregulation, monetary policy, and central banking," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue May, pages 3-22.
  5. Charles W. Calomiris, 1998. "The IMF's Imprudent Role As Lender of Last Resort," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), pages 275-294, Winter.
  6. Eichengreen, Barry & Watson, Mark W & Grossman, Richard S, 1985. "Bank Rate Policy under the Interwar Gold Standard: A Dynamic Probit Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(379), pages 725-45, September.
  7. Curzio Giannini, 1999. "Enemy of None But a Common Friend of All? An International Perspectiveon the Lender-Of-Last-Resort Function," IMF Working Papers 99/10, International Monetary Fund.
  8. C.A.E. Goodhart, 1997. "Whither now?," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 50(203), pages 385-430.
  9. C.A.E. Goodhart, 1997. "Whither now?," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 50(203), pages 385-430.
  10. Miron, Jeffrey A, 1986. "Financial Panics, the Seasonality of the Nominal Interest Rate, and theFounding of the Fed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 125-40, March.
  11. Walter B. Wriston, 1998. "Dumb Networks and Smart Capital," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), Winter.
  12. Bordo, Michael D. & Schwartz, Anna J., 2000. "Measuring real economic effects of bailouts: historical perspectives on how countries in financial distress have fared with and without bailouts," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 81-167, December.
  13. Anna J. Schwartz, 1992. "The misuse of the Fed's discount window," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 58-69.
  14. Geoffrey Wood, 2000. "The Lender of Last Resort Reconsidered," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 203-227, December.
  15. Goodhart, C A E, 1987. "Why Do Banks Need a Central Bank?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 75-89, March.
  16. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall.
  17. Charles Goodhart, 1999. "Myths About the Lender of Last Resort," FMG Special Papers sp120, Financial Markets Group.
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