Contingent Protection as Better Insurance
We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents cannot contract insurance. We show that these measures are superior to uniform tariffs as insurance mechanisms. Moreover, we demonstrate that the optimal uniform policy may not involve a tariff at all, but rather might entail an export tax. We also show that a tax cum subsidy policy (i.e., taxing all sectors in order to subsidize the shocked sector) improves welfare.
|Date of creation:||Feb 1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-37, December.
- Robert W. Staiger, 1994.
"International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy,"
NBER Working Papers
4962, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Staiger, Robert W., 1995. "International rules and institutions for trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1495-1551 Elsevier.
- Avinash Dixit, 2005.
"Trade And Insurance With Imperfectly Observed Outcomes,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,
in: An Inframarginal Approach To Trade Theory, chapter 5, pages 75-84
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Avinash Dixit, 1989. "Trade and Insurance with Imperfectly Observed Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(1), pages 195-203.
- Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1994.
"Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States,"
NBER Working Papers
4696, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert Staiger & Frank Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," International Trade 9410004, EconWPA.
- Staiger, R.W. & Wolak, F.A., 1994. "Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumpting in the United States," Working papers 9413, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1987.
"Trade and insurance with moral hazard,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 201-220, November.
- Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1995. "The Road Most Taken: the Rise of Title VII Protection," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 295-313, 03.
- Avinash Dixit, 1989. "Trade and Insurance with Adverse Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 235-247.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6933. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.