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An introduction to the WTO and GATT

  • Meredith A. Crowley

This article reviews the history of GATT and the WTO. It discusses the founding principles of the post-WW II world trading system--reciprocity and nondiscrimination. Lastly, the article reviews the economics literature on regional trade agreements and administered protection, two important exceptions to GATT's requirement in trade policy.

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Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its journal Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): (2003)
Issue (Month): Q IV ()
Pages: 42-57

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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhep:y:2003:i:qiv:p:42-57:n:v.27no.4
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  1. Collie, D., 1990. "Export Subsidies And Countervailing Tariffs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 353, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  2. Bagwell,K. & Staiger,R.W., 1999. "Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT," Working papers 6, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. Dixit, Avinash, 1988. "Anti-dumping and countervailing duties under oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 55-68, January.
  4. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1990. "The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly," NBER Working Papers 3254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Spencer, Barbara J., 1988. "Capital subsidies and countervailing duties in oligopolistic industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 45-69, August.
  6. Jagdish Bhagwati, 1992. "Regionalism versus Multilateralism," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 535-556, 09.
  7. Thomas J. Prusa, 1999. "On the spread and impact of antidumping," Departmental Working Papers 199916, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  8. Sampson, Gary P, 1996. "Compatibility of Regional and Multilateral Trading Agreements: Reforming the WTO Process," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 88-92, May.
  9. Brainard, S. Lael & Verdier, Thierry, 1997. "The political economy of declining industries: Senescent industry collapse revisited," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 221-237, February.
  10. Bond, Eric W. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1996. "The size of trading blocs Market power and world welfare effects," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 411-437, May.
  11. Ronald D. Fischer & 1998, 1998. "Contingent protection as better insurance," Documentos de Trabajo 49, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  12. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1997. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Free Trade Areas," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(2), pages 291-319, May.
  13. Kiminori Matsuyama, 1987. "Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game," Discussion Papers 738, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Wilfred J. Ethier, 2002. "Unilateralism in a Multilateral World," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(479), pages 266-292, April.
  15. Miyagiwa, Kaz & Ohno, Yuka, 1999. "Credibility of Protection and Incentives to Innovate," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 143-63, February.
  16. John McLaren, 2002. "A Theory Of Insidious Regionalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(2), pages 571-608, May.
  17. Crowley, Meredith A., 2006. "Do safeguard tariffs and antidumping duties open or close technology gaps?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 469-484, March.
  18. Gruenspecht, Howard K., 1988. "Dumping and dynamic competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 225-248, November.
  19. Richard Arena, 2002. "Introduction," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 112(5), pages 627-633.
  20. Levy, Philip I, 1997. "A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 506-19, September.
  21. Caroline Freund, 2000. "Different Paths To Free Trade: The Gains From Regionalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1317-1341, November.
  22. Hillman, Arye L, 1984. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives: Errata," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(1), pages 260, March.
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