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Multiple equilibria in government transfer policy

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  • Forteza, Alvaro

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  • Forteza, Alvaro, 2001. "Multiple equilibria in government transfer policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 531-555, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:17:y:2001:i:3:p:531-555
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    Cited by:

    1. Bucheli, Marisa & Forteza, Alvaro & Rossi, Ianina, 2008. "Work history and the access to contributory pensions in Uruguay : some facts and policy options," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 90345, The World Bank.

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