Health Insurance Provision and Labor Market Efficiency in the United States
Health Insurance has claimed a prominent place on the policy agenda in the United States. Critics argue that the status quo has lead to spiraling health care costs, an inequitable distribution of quality medical care, and that employer-provided health insurance has "locked" individuals into jobs, thereby interfering with the efficient matching of employers and employees. In contrast to the United States, Germany guarantees virtually all citizens health insurance. Insurance is portable, but the cost may change when an individual changes jobs, again leading to the potential for job-lock. This paper assesses the empirical magnitude of health insurance-related impediments to job mobility in the United States and Germany, The results show little evidence that health insurance provision interferes with job mobility in either the United States or Germany, thus suggesting that these employer-based systems for providing the health insurance portion of the social safety net do not alter this aspect of labor market efficiency.
|Date of creation:||Jun 1993|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Douglas Holtz-Eakin, 1994. "Health Insurance Provision and Labor Market Efficiency in the United States and Germany," NBER Chapters, in: Social Protection versus Economic Flexibility: Is There a Trade-Off?, pages 157-188 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.|
|Note:||HC LS PE|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alan Gustman & Thomas Steinmeier, 1990.
"Pension Portability and Labor Mobility: Evidence From the Survey of Income and Program Participation,"
NBER Working Papers
3525, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gustman, Alan L. & Steinmeier, Thomas L., 1993. "Pension portability and labor mobility : Evidence from the survey of income and program participation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 299-323, March.
- Olivia S. Mitchell, 1983. "Fringe Benefits and the Cost of Changing Jobs," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 37(1), pages 70-78, October.
- Jonathan Gruber, 1992.
"The Efficiency of a Group-Specific Mandated Benefit: Evidence From Health Insurance Benefits for Maternity,"
NBER Working Papers
4157, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gruber, J., 1992. "The Efficiency of a Group-Specific Mandated Benefit: Evidence from Health Insurance Benefits for Maternity," Working papers 92-19, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Olivia S. Mitchell, 1982. "Fringe Benefits and Labor Mobility," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 17(2), pages 286-298.
- Olivia S. Mitchell, 1983. "Fringe benefits and the cost of changing jobs," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 37(1), pages 70-78, October.
- Brown, James N & Light, Audrey, 1992. "Interpreting Panel Data on Job Tenure," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 10(3), pages 219-57, July.
- Victor R. Fuchs, 1991. "National Health Insurance Revisited," NBER Working Papers 3884, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4388. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.