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The Political Economy of Controls: American Sugar

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  • Anne O. Krueger

Abstract

This paper outlines the salient characteristics of competing models of economic regulation and controls. It then examines the evolution of the American sugar program from 1934 to 1987 in the light of these models. While lobbying and other features of traditional models were clearly important, other elements also played a key role. In particular, a technocracy developed, and complexity of regulation served as an important factor perpetuating the sugar program. Similarly, lobbying and the role of vested interests was clearly important in the evolution of the program once it began but there was an element of ?accident? in the programs initiation. Once it existed, it became an instrument to be captured and used by politicians, technocrats, and economic interests alike.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne O. Krueger, 1988. "The Political Economy of Controls: American Sugar," NBER Working Papers 2504, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2504
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gerber, David J, 1976. "The United States Sugar Quota Program: A Study in the Direct Congressional Control of Imports," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 103-147, April.
    2. Sturgiss, Robert & Wong, Gordon & Borrell, Brent, 1987. "Policy Intervention, Price Variability and the International Sugar Agreement: An Econometric Model of the World Sugar Market," Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES) Archive 316157, Australian Government, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    4. Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Srinivasan, T N, 1980. "Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(6), pages 1069-1087, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Douglass C. North, 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 355-367, October.
    2. Coggins, Jay S., 1989. "On the Welfare Consequences of Political Activity," Bulletins 7463, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
    3. Valentin L. Krustev & T. Clifton Morgan, 2011. "Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 351-376, September.
    4. Christian, Thomas & Rashad, Inas, 2009. "Trends in U.S. food prices, 1950-2007," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 113-120, March.
    5. Bedi, Arjun S., 1999. "The Role of Information and Communication Technologies in Economic Development: A Partial Survey," Discussion Papers 279848, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
    6. Mustapha Nabli, 1990. "The political economy of trade liberalization in developing countries," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 111-145, June.
    7. Sturgiss, Robert & Field, Heather & Young, Linda, 1990. "1990 and US Sugar Policy Reform," Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES) Archive 316167, Australian Government, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences.

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