Deposit Insurance and Orderly Liquidation without Commitment: Can we Sleep Well?
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2013. "Government Debt and Banking Fragility: The Spreading of Strategic Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 19278, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2013-06-16 (Central Banking)
- NEP-IAS-2013-06-16 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2013-06-16 (Macroeconomics)
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