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Tipping Climate Negotiations

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  • Geoffrey Heal
  • Howard Kunreuther

Abstract

Thinking about tipping provides a novel perspective on finding a way forward in climate negotiations and suggests an alternative to the current framework of negotiating a global agreement on reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Recent work on non-cooperative games shows games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a "tipping set," a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same. We argue that international climate negotiations may form such a game and so have a tipping set. This set is a small group of countries who by adopting climate control measures can make in the interests of all others to do likewise.

Suggested Citation

  • Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, 2011. "Tipping Climate Negotiations," NBER Working Papers 16954, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16954
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    1. Schelling, Thomas C, 1969. "Models of Segregation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 488-493, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Karp, Larry & Simon, Leo, 2013. "Participation games and international environmental agreements: A non-parametric model," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 326-344.
    2. Marco Battaglini & Bård Harstad, 2016. "Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(1), pages 160-204.
    3. Diane Coyle, 2016. "The Political Economy of National Statistics," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1603, Economics, The University of Manchester.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth

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