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Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation

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Listed:
  • Matias Iaryczower
  • Pablo Spiller
  • Mariano Tommasi

Abstract

This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Matias Iaryczower & Pablo Spiller & Mariano Tommasi, 2005. "Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation," NBER Working Papers 11317, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11317
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, 2003. "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?," NBER Working Papers 9409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Mario Bergara & Barak Richman & Pablo T. Spiller, 2002. "Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: Congressional Constraint," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1402, Department of Economics - dECON.
    3. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    4. repec:cup:apsrev:v:88:y:1994:i:01:p:33-47_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-877, October.
    6. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-661, May.
    7. repec:cup:apsrev:v:80:y:1986:i:01:p:89-106_18 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Lohmann, Susanne, 1995. "Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 267-284, December.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:96:y:2002:i:02:p:291-303_00 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Iaryczower, Matias & Lewis, Garrett & Shum, Matthew, 2013. "To elect or to appoint? Bias, information, and responsiveness of bureaucrats and politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 230-244.
    2. Santiago Urbiztondo & Marcela Cristini & Cynthia Moskovits & Sebastián Saiegh, 2009. "The Political Economy of Productivity in Argentina: Interpretation and Illustration," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1119, Inter-American Development Bank.
    3. repec:kap:copoec:v:29:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-017-9252-z is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Roberto Cortes Conde, 2008. "Spanish America Colonial Patterns: The Rio de La Plata," Working Papers 96, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2008.
    5. Jarosław Kantorowicz & Nuno Garoupa, 2016. "An empirical analysis of constitutional review voting in the polish constitutional tribunal, 2003–2014," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 66-92, March.
    6. Garoupa, Nuno & Grembi, Veronica, 2015. "Judicial review and political partisanship: Moving from consensual to majoritarian democracy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 32-45.
    7. Pablo T. Spiller & Sanny Liao, 2006. "Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups' Participation in Policy Making - A Selective Survey," NBER Working Papers 12209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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