This chapter introduces the economics and identity literature, and discusses the relationship between social identity and personal identity. It distinguishes categorical and relational types of social identities, and argues that the former are more readily associated with instrumentally rational behavior, while the latter, which involve close contact with others in roles and social positions, are more readily associated with behavior in which individuals unilaterally reciprocate the actions of others - what Bruni terms unilateral altruism, which involves a non-instrumental or deontological type of motivation. The chapter also distinguishes two views of personal identity as relational in nature, Bachrach's game-theoretic approach and one based on collective intentionality theory, and concludes by arguing that the Homo economicus view of personal identity is circular.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: P.O. Box 1881, Milwaukee WI 53201-1881|
Phone: (414) 288-7377
Web page: http://business.marquette.edu/departments/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2000-02, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mrq:wpaper:2011-08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Andrew G. Meyer)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.