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Outsourcing, Complementary Innovations and Growth

  • Alireza Naghavi

    ()

  • Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano

    ()

This paper studies the parallel creation of complementary upstream and downstream innovations by independent labs to shed light on the impact of outsourcing on R&D when supply contracts are incomplete. In particular, we argue that outsourced upstream production contributes to the emergence of innovation networks by creating a demand for upstream R&D. We then analyze under which conditions this leads to faster innovation than in the case of vertically integrated production relying on integrated R&D. In the presence of incomplete supply contracts, the ex-post bargaining power of upstream and downstream parties feeds back to innovation. This determines whether outsourcing decisions leading to static gains from specialized production generate or not also dynamic gains in terms of faster innovation.

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File URL: http://www.recent.unimore.it/wp/RECent-wp19.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi" in its series Center for Economic Research (RECent) with number 019.

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Length: pages 23
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mod:recent:019
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.recent.unimore.it/

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  1. Pol Antràs, 2003. "Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1375-1418.
  2. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2003. "Outsourcing Versus FDI in Industry Equilibrium," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 317-327, 04/05.
  4. Marin, Dalia & Verdier, Thierry, 2002. "Globalization and the 'New Enterprise'," Discussion Papers in Economics 11, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  5. Robert C. Feenstra & Gordon H. Hanson, 2004. "Ownership and Control in Outsourcing to China: Estimating the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 10198, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2006. "Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(1), pages 37-74, 03.
  7. Elhanan Helpman, 2006. "Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 589-630, September.
  8. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
  9. Naghavi, Alireza & Ottaviano, Gianmarco, 2006. "Outsourcing, Contracts and Innovation Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 5681, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Jones, Charles I, 1995. "R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 759-84, August.
  11. Robert Feenstra, 2003. "Integration Of Trade And Disintegration Of Production In The Global Economy," Working Papers 986, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  12. Markusen, James R., 2002. "Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade," MPRA Paper 8380, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Ottaviano, Gianmarco, 2007. "Contract Enforcement, Comparative Advantage and Long-Run Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 6419, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Edwin Lai & Raymond Riezman & Ping Wang, 2009. "Outsourcing of innovation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 485-515, March.
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