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Repeated game strategies in local and group prisoner's dilemma

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  • Kirchkamp, Oliver
  • Nagel, Rosemarie

Abstract

We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies from observed data in spatial and spaceless prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We start with a model where players choose a fixed action that remains constant for all repetitions of a stage game. As an extension we then allow players to choose simple repeated game strategies that, however, remain fixed over the course of the game. We then discuss a method how to identify changing repeated game strategies. This method is used to study a simple reinforcement model. We find that in a spatial structure reinforcement plays a more important role than in a spaceless structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirchkamp, Oliver & Nagel, Rosemarie, 2001. "Repeated game strategies in local and group prisoner's dilemma," Papers 00-50, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
  • Handle: RePEc:mnh:spaper:2818
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    2. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-881, September.
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    4. Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1999. "Simultaneous evolution of learning rules and strategies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 295-312, November.
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    7. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Nagel, Rosemarie, 2000. "Local and group interaction in prisoners' dilemma experiments," Papers 00-11, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Local interaction ; experiments ; prisoner’s dilemma ; reinforcement ; repeated games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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