On the Private Provision of Public Goods on Networks
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- Allouch, Nizar, 2015. "On the private provision of public goods on networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 527-552.
- Nizar Allouch, 2012. "On the Private Provision of Public Goods on Networks," Working Papers 2012.40, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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More about this item
KeywordsPublic goods; Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium; Network games; Neutrality; Bonacich centrality; Main eigenvalue;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-03-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-03-08 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2012-03-08 (Network Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2012-03-08 (Public Finance)
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