No imitation - on local and group interaction, learning and reciprocity in prisoners\
This study disentangles experimentally imitation, reinforcement, and reciprocity in repeated prisoners' dilemmas. We compare a simple situation in which players interact only with their neighbours (local interaction) with one where players interact with all members of the population (group interaction). We observe choices under different information conditions and estimate parameters of a learning model. We find that imitation, while assumed to be a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, is often a negligible factor in the experiment. Behaviour is predominantly driven by reinforcement learning.
|Date of creation:||25 Feb 2003|
|Note:||Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim and the Spanish DGIC Tecnica PB95-0983is gratefully acknowledged.|
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- Antoni Bosch-DomËnech & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2003.
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Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 495-524, 04.
- Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 1998. "Imitation of succesful behavior in Cournot markets," Economics Working Papers 269, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 1999.
- Glen Ellison, 2010.
"Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
391, David K. Levine.
- Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-881, September.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1998.
"Simultaneous evolution of learning rules and strategies,"
98-46, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1999. "Simultaneous evolution of learning rules and strategies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 295-312, November.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1996. "Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies," Discussion Paper Serie B 379, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1996. "Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-46, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Eshel, I. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A., 1996.
"Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model,"
9612, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Eshel, I. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A., 1996. "Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," Working papers 9612r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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