Efficient Promotion of Renewable Energy with Reverse Auctions
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Cited by:
- Cassetta, Ernesto & Monarca, Umberto & Nava, Consuelo Rubina & Meleo, Linda, 2017. "Is the answer blowin' in the wind (auctions)? An assessment of the Italian support scheme," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 662-674.
- Cassetta, Ernesto & Meleo, Linda & Monarca, Umberto & Nava, Consuelo R., 2017. "Is the answer blowin' in the wind (auctions)? An assessment of Italian auction procedures to promote onshore wind energy," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201709, University of Turin.
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More about this item
Keywords
Auction Design; Tendering; Renewable Energy; Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard; Burden Sharing;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENE-2016-02-04 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2016-02-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-REG-2016-02-04 (Regulation)
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