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Household Allocations and Endogenous Information

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  • Joost de Laat

Abstract

This paper tests for the endogeneity of one of the main elements separating different models of intrahousehold allocations, namely the household information set. Based on unusually rich data, I find that split migrant couples in the Nairobi slums invest considerable resources into information acquisition through visits, sibling and child monitoring, budget submissions, and marital search. I also find potentially substantial welfare losses when information acquisition becomes costly, not only through reduced remittances but more importantly as families opt for family migration into the slums. That households invest in information when there are welfare gains complements a large and growing literature that seeks to explain intrahousehold allocations through more complex modes of decision-making.

Suggested Citation

  • Joost de Laat, 2008. "Household Allocations and Endogenous Information," Cahiers de recherche 0827, CIRPEE.
  • Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0827
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alistair Munro, 2014. "Hide and Seek: A Theory of Efficient Income Hiding within the Household," GRIPS Discussion Papers 14-17, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
    2. De Arcangelis, Giuseppe & Joxhe, Majlinda & McKenzie, David & Tiongson, Erwin & Yang, Dean, 2015. "Directing remittances to education with soft and hard commitments: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment and new product take-up among Filipino migrants in Rome," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 197-208.
    3. Nava Ashraf & Diego Aycinena & Claudia Martínez A. & Dean Yang, 2015. "Savings in Transnational Households: A Field Experiment among Migrants from El Salvador," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 332-351, May.
    4. Torero, Máximo & Viceisza, Angelino, 2015. "To remit, or not to remit: that is the question. A remittance field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 221-236.
    5. Akresh, Richard & Edmonds, Eric V., 2010. "The Analytical Returns to Measuring a Detailed Household Roster," IZA Discussion Papers 4759, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Yang, Dean, 2009. "International Migration and Human Development," MPRA Paper 19212, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Hoel, Jessica B., 2015. "Heterogeneous households: A within-subject test of asymmetric information between spouses in Kenya," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 123-135.
    8. Marlon Seror, 2015. "Modeling and Measuring Information Asymmetry in the Context of Senegalese Migrants' Remittances," Working Papers DT/2015/23, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Survey Methods; Household production and Intrahousehold Allocation; Marriage; Family Structure; Migration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F17 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Forecasting and Simulation

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