The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation
This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas). Detailed evidence of roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) shows that most roscas are predominantly composed of women. To explain this phenomenon, we propose an argument based on conflictual interactions within the household, where husbands and wives have differential savings patterns due to different valuations of an indivisible good. We test the empirical implications of the model using data collected from the Kenyan slum.
|Date of creation:||01 Aug 2000|
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- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate & Glenn Loury, 1994. "Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, Credit Markets and Efficiency," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 701-719.
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