Regole di tutela e sanzioni: il caso della patente a punti
Economic theory does not seem to have a valid explanation of the emergence and success of demerit point based driving licenses across many countries. In fact, the theory of optimal deterrence would imply, in such circumstances, a system based on monetary sanctions. Some extensions of the standard theory have been explored, however they do not seem to size both the nature of the sanctioning mechanism applied and the goals of the lawmaker. In this paper we try to frame the demerit point mechanism within the conceptual co-ordinates of the property rules and liability rules as stylised by Calabresi and Melamed (1972). We enlighten how circulation laws address the problem of the protection of different entitlements, of both public and private, monetary and non monetary nature, which, moreover, are protected through a plurality of rules of protection. The demerit point mechanism has been simply added to this portfolio of tools and has been specifically deployed for the pursuit of the entitlement of the "health of all those involved in circulation". Moreover, we show how such a mechanism addresses the incoherence of punishing the violation of an inalienable entitlement, such as the "right of health", with a sanction which is more consistent with a property rule. Some results might be generalised. An in-depth analysis of the plurality of entitlements protected by a certain law may entail the need of a plurality of rules of protection. Moreover, the deterrence effect of a specific rule may crucially depend on the consistency between the nature of the entitlement and the rule of protection applied.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2005|
|Publication status:||Published in LIUC papers, no.173, 2005 - Etica, diritto ed economia 13|
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