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Correlated Values in the Theory of Property and Liability Rules

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  • Ian Ayres
  • Paul M. Goldbart

Abstract

Louis Kaplow and Stven Shavell have shown that liability rules tend to efficiently harness the defendant’s private information when courts are imperfectly informed as to litigants’ valuations. But they claim that liability rules cannot harness private information when the disputants’ valuations are correlated. This article rejects the correlated-value claim. While correlated valuations create real problems of implementation, Kaplow and Shavell’s own harnessing result can be extended to redeem the usefulness of liability rules. When values are correlated, enlightened courts can enlarge the damages that takers expect to pay so as to induce efficient takings. The relative efficiency of property and liability rules turns out to be independent of whether the disputants’ values are correlated.

Suggested Citation

  • Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, 2003. "Correlated Values in the Theory of Property and Liability Rules," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 121-151, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:32:y:2003:p:121-151
    DOI: 10.1086/368009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ian Ayres & Paul Goldbart, "undated". "Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1026, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
    2. Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Alan, 1991. "Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 27-53, Spring.
    3. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
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    5. Sergio Di Nola & Matteo Rizzolli, 2005. "Regole di tutela e sanzioni: il caso della patente a punti," LIUC Papers in Ethics, Law and Economics 173, Cattaneo University (LIUC).

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