An Experiment on subjective Game Valuations
We experimentally test the hypothesis that players' valuations of a game coincide with their Nash equilibrium earnings. Our results offer significantly less support for this hypothesis than for the prediction of dominant strategy play.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2006|
|Date of revision:||Apr 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +44 (0) 1509 222701
Fax: +44 (0) 1509 223910
Web page: http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/sbe/research/economics/index.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998.
Levine's Working Paper Archive
237, David K. Levine.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2006_4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Huw Edwards)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.