Payments for Ecosystem Services: Can we kill two birds with one stone? Insights from a Natural Field Experiment in Madagascar
The explicit assumption underlying Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) is that offering payments that are at least equal to individual’s opportunity cost will establish individuals’ participation. At the same time, that payment should act as a substitution within landowners’ global income, making environmental conservation compatible with economic development goals, and suitable for win-win policy. This partially acts under the more general hypothesis of money fungibility built-in neoclassical economic premise. Meanwhile, behavioural economics demonstrate that individuals track their financial activities using a set of cognitive labels depending to the context in which it was obtained, each of which being associated with a different marginal propensity to consume. Based on a ‘Humans’ vs. ‘Econs’ approach, we test the effect of income’s origin (‘Low effort’ based money vs. ‘High effort’ based money) on spending decisions (Necessity vs. Superior goods) and pro social preferences (Contribution to a public good) within Madagascar rural areas that are potential beneficiaries of PES programs, using a natural field experiment. Our findings support that human’s behavioural responses matter and could, under some circumstances, alter environmental conservation policies.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2014|
|Date of revision:||Jan 2014|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Avenue Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2|
Web page: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lucy F. Ackert & Narat Charupat & Bryan K. Church & James Tompkins & Richard Deaves, 2003.
"An experimental examination of the house money effect in a multi-period setting,"
FRB Atlanta Working Paper
2003-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Lucy Ackert & Narat Charupat & Bryan Church & Richard Deaves, 2006. "An experimental examination of the house money effect in a multi-period setting," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 5-16, April.
- Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2004.
"Incentives and Prosocial Behavior,"
137, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.
- Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2005. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," NBER Working Papers 11535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," IDEI Working Papers 389, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2006.
- Benabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2005. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 1695, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2004. "Incentives and Prosocial Behaviour," CEPR Discussion Papers 4633, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," Post-Print hal-00173700, HAL.
- d'Adda, Giovanna, 2011. "Motivation crowding in environmental protection: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(11), pages 2083-2097, September.
- Christoph Engel, 2011.
"Dictator games: a meta study,"
Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 583-610, November.
- Christoph Engel, 2010. "Dictator Games: A Meta Study," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Jan 2011.
- Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "The relative price of fairness: gender differences in a punishment game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 143-158, August.
- Bucheli, Marisa & García-Muñoz, Teresa & Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Brañas Garza, Pablo, 2012.
"Moral cleansing and moral licenses: experimental evidence,"
DFAEII Working Papers
8763, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
- Brañas-Garza, Pablo & Bucheli, Marisa & Paz Espinosa, María & García-Muñoz, Teresa, 2013. "Moral Cleansing And Moral Licenses: Experimental Evidence," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(02), pages 199-212, July.
- Pablo Brañas-Garza & Marisa Bucheli & María Paz Espinosa & Teresa García-Muñoz, 2011. "Moral Cleansing and Moral Licenses: experimental evidence," Working Papers 11-16, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Davies, Simon & Easaw, Joshy & Ghoshray, Atanu, 2009. "Mental accounting and remittances: A study of rural Malawian households," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 321-334, June.
- Börner, Jan & Wunder, Sven & Wertz-Kanounnikoff, Sheila & Tito, Marcos Rügnitz & Pereira, Ligia & Nascimento, Nathalia, 2010. "Direct conservation payments in the Brazilian Amazon: Scope and equity implications," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(6), pages 1272-1282, April.
- Bulte, Erwin H. & Lipper, Leslie & Stringer, Randy & Zilberman, David, 2008. "Payments for ecosystem services and poverty reduction: concepts, issues, and empirical perspectives," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(03), pages 245-254, June.
- Todd L. Cherry & Peter Frykblom & Jason F. Shogren, 2002.
"Hardnose the Dictator,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1218-1221, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:14-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Patricia Modat)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.