National Responses to Transnational Terrorism: Intelligence and Counterterrorism Provision
Intelligence about transnational terrorist threats is generally gathered by national agencies. I set up and analyze a game theoretic model to study the implications of national intelligence gathering for the provision of domestic (defensive) counterterrorism when two countries are facing a transnational terrorist threat. It is shown that, relative to a benchmark case where all intelligence is commonly known, national intelligence gathering often leads to increased overprovision, although it can be the other way around. By extending the model with a com munication stage, I also explore the possibilities for intelligence sharing prior to decisions on counterterrorism provision. If verifiable sharing is a viable option for each country, there exists an equilibrium with full intelligence sharing. On the other hand, if only cheap talk communication is possible then full sharing cannot happen in equilibrium.
|Date of creation:||15 Nov 2012|
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- Todd Sandler & Kevin Siqueira, 2006. "Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre-emption," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1370-1387, November.
- Sandler, Todd & Enders, Walter, 2004. "An economic perspective on transnational terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-316, June.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 2007. "Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(01), pages 9-36, January.
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