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Inequality and Political Clientelism: Evidence from South India

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  • Thomas Markussen

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The paper discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be strongly affected by economic inequality.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Markussen, 2010. "Inequality and Political Clientelism: Evidence from South India," Discussion Papers 10-26, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1026
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2010/1026.pdf/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. La Ferrara, Eliana, 2002. "Inequality and group participation: theory and evidence from rural Tanzania," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 235-273, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chau, Nancy H. & Liu, Yanyan & Soundararajan, Vidhya, 2017. "Political activism as a determinant of clientelistic transfers: Evidence from an Indian public works program," IFPRI discussion papers 1700, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    2. Ebney Ayaj Rana & Mustafa Kamal, 2018. "Does Clientelism Affect Income Inequality? Evidence from Panel Data," Journal of Income Distribution, Ad libros publications inc., vol. 26(1), pages 1-24, March.
    3. Thapliyal, Sneha & Mukherji, Arnab & Malghan, Deepak, 2019. "Economic inequality and loss of commons: Evidence from India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 693-712.
    4. Markussen, Thomas & Ngo, Quang-Thanh, 2019. "Economic and non-economic returns to communist party membership in Vietnam," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 370-384.
    5. Sutoris, Peter, 2018. "Elitism and its challengers: Educational development ideology in postcolonial India through the prism of film, 1950–1970," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1-9.
    6. Bhaumik, Sumon Kumar & Frensch, Richard & Huber, Stephan, 2021. "Political economy of labour market institutions in a globalised era," GLO Discussion Paper Series 786, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    7. Anindya Bhattacharya & Anirban Kar & Alita Nandi, 2016. "Local Institutional Structure and Clientelistic Access to Employment: The Case of MGNREGS in Three States of India," Working Papers id:11549, eSocialSciences.
    8. Rahul Mukherji & Seyed Hossein Zarhani & K. Raju, 2018. "State Capacity and Welfare Politics in India: Implementing the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in Undivided Andhra Pradesh," Indian Journal of Human Development, , vol. 12(2), pages 282-297, August.
    9. Ulrike Müller, 2012. "Pro-poor Service Delivery and Social Identity," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2012-055, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    10. repec:unu:wpaper:wp2012-55 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Chau, Nancy H. & Liu, Yanyan & Soundararajan, Vidhya, 2021. "Political activism as a determinant of strategic transfers: Evidence from an indian public works program," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    12. Markussen, Thomas & Ngo, Quang-Thanh, 2019. "Economic and non-economic returns to communist party membership in Vietnam," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 370-384.
    13. Lawrence Adu Asamoah, 2021. "Institutional Quality and Income Inequality in Developing Countries: A Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis," Progress in Development Studies, , vol. 21(2), pages 123-143, April.
    14. Anindya Bhattacharya & Anirban Kar & Alita Nandi, 2023. "Asymmetric networks, clientelism and their impacts: households' access to workfare employment in rural India," Papers 2304.04236, arXiv.org.
    15. Kyriacou, Andreas P., 2023. "Clientelism and fiscal redistribution: Evidence across countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    16. Vandeplas, Anneleen, 2011. "Multinationals or Cooperatives: Does it Matter to Farmers? - A Study of the Dairy Sector in Punjab (India)," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 115545, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    17. Müller, Ulrike, 2012. "Pro-poor Service Delivery and Social Identity," WIDER Working Paper Series 055, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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