Pork barrel politics, voter turnout, and inequality: An experimental study
We experimentally study pork barrel politics in two-candidate majoritarian elections. Candidates form distinct supporter groups by favoring some voters in budget spending at the expense of others. We compare voluntary and compulsory costly voting and find that, on average, the former mode induces more narrowly targeted favors and therefore more inequality among otherwise identical voters. When the same candidates act over many elections, such as with parties, they tend to cultivate policy polarization by frequently favoring their exclusive supporters again and avoiding those of the opponent, and with compulsory voting we find additional frequent policy overlap for a separate subset of voters. Our findings are important for understanding how an inclination towards a sustained "divided society" can arise purely from the political process, absent of any coordination devices such as ideological preferences.
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- Subhasish Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2013.
"An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(3), pages 833-861, April.
- Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2009.
"An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games
[Eine experimentelle Untersuchung von „Colonel Blotto“-Spielen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2009-08, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock J. & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 2688, CESifo Group Munich.
- Chowdhury, Subhasish & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman, 2011. "An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games," MPRA Paper 46810, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Colin M. Campbell, 1999. "Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1199-1217, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
- Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2009. "An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games
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