Unilateral Emission Standards, Quality of Vertically Differentiated Products, and the Global Environment
Employing an environmentally-differentiated products model with heterogeneous consumers in terms of environmental consciousness, this paper examines the effect of a unilateral change in a home emission standard on the qualities of products, aggregate emissions, and welfare of both home and foreign countries. When firms compete with each other in a Cournot fashion, as the home emission standard becomes stricter, aggregate emissions of both domestic and foreign countries decrease, if a firm which produces a gdirtier producthf supplies the same product to both domestic and foreign markets. On the other hand, if the firm supplies different products in environmental features to different markets, a stricter emission standard by the home government increases aggregate emissions of the foreign country. Even in the Bertrand duopoly case, the effects of a stricter emission standard on both countries could be different from each other.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2010|
|Date of revision:||Jul 2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www-econ.kwansei.ac.jp/~econ/index_e.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- José Moraga-González & Noemi Padrón-Fumero, 2002. "Environmental Policy in a Green Market," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(3), pages 419-447, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Toshihiro Okada)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.