Potential Failure of an International Environmental Agreement under Asymmetric Information
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- Norimichi Matsueda, 2004. "Potential Failure of an International Environmental Agreement under Asymmetric Information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(4), pages 1-8.
References listed on IDEAS
- Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249, March.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
- Missfeldt, Fanny, 1999. " Game-Theoretic Modelling of Transboundary Pollution," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 287-321, July.
- Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
- Claus Huber & Franz Wirl, 1996. "Optimal incentives to reduce transboundary emissions: Theory and empirical illustration to sulphur emissions in Austria and (former) Czechoslovakia," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 149-172, June.
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- Michael Jakob & Kai Lessmann, 2012. "Signaling in international environmental agreements: the case of early and delayed action," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 309-325, November.
More about this item
Keywordsasymmetric information; perfect Bayesian equilibrium; signaling game; unidirectional transboundary pollution; Victim pays principle;
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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